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The Idea of the Devil and the Problem of the Indian: 
the Case of Mexico in the Sixteenth Century 
Introduction 
The aim of this paper1 is to attempt an assessment of the role played by the 
concept of the devil in the way in which the native cultures of America, 
especially Mexico, were perceived and interpreted by European missionaries 
and intellectuals during the first decades of evangelisation. 
In view of the renewed attention that scholars have recently been devoting 
to the question of the 'spiritual conquest', it might seem surprising that such a 
study has not been attempted before, especially since much of this interest has 
derived from the proliferation of studies into popular cultures where the 
diabolic often played a conspicuous role.2 It is, however, precisely this stress 
on the importance of popular cultural expressions that has made the subject of 
diabolism an awkward one. For, given that popular cultures were primarily oral 
and thus perceivable almost exclusively through the filter of the educated, the 
success of investigations into popular beliefs has, as a rule, tended to depend 
on the way in which scholars handle case histories and subject them to detailed 
micro-analyses. This approach makes it difficult to study the global context 
thoroughly and often makes it necessary - as a French scholar recently stated 
- to 'abandon erudition' in order to 'renew the questions put to the sources', 
'with all the dead-ends, errors and risks inherent in that kind of undertaking'.3 
On the other hand, the reasons why the more intellectual aspects of diabolism 
should hitherto have been largely avoided are even more straightforward. For 
historians of ideas have often tended to deal with themes which are more 
readily understandable from a modern standpoint, where the concept of the 
devil is apt to generate a sense of embarrassment. As a result, their outlook at 
times seems to be blunted by a prejudice similar to that observed by Peter 
Brown in the attitudes most commonly shown towards the cult of the saints. 
Here, Brown tells us, the 'enlightened' contempt of the 'vulgar' led to the 
supposition that a potentially enlightened few - whose theism was identified 
with the elevated message of Christianity - were being subjected to continual 
upward pressure from the habits of the lower classes, whose 'religion' was 
totally distinct from the 'truer' and 'purer' sensibility of the elites.4 
But the perpetuation of this bipartite approach has in no way been the sole 
responsibility of the intellectual historians. Social historians and historians of 
popular cultures have themselves tended to treat the diabolic with a note of 
uneasiness which in many ways resembles the attitude of their intellectual 
peers. If it is true that recent approaches have been considerably more 
sympathetic towards popular cultures, it is now these which are more often seen 
as the bearers of the more genuine and authentic values, as if they were 
engaged in a battle against the truncated artificiality of the elites. In such a 
context, diabolism has at best been seen as the appropriation of a dominant 
idea; at worst, it has been explained as an imposition of the elites upon the 
popular in an attempt to keep them under their control. 
Thus, by adopting premises which implicitly deny religious sentiment any 
intellectual foundation, this bipartite approach has tended to render historians 
insensitive to the thought processes and needs that led to the rise and expansion 
of diabolism. It cannot be stressed enough, however, that the idea of the devil 
was an intellectual construction and that it needs to be considered seriously as 
such if it is to be understood at all. Just how central and intellectually 
persuasive the concept was during the 'spiritual conquest' of Mexico is the 
question that I aim to explore in this paper. 
Discovery and optimism: the Devil's defeat 
The idea of the devil as an immanent power, as God's grand cosmic antagonist 
and as a dramatic instrument of God's justice, was fundamental to the 
intellectual edifice of Christendom. However commonplace such a statement 
may sound to the modern reader, it is important to understand its implications 
in their contemporary setting: as living and changing realities in the minds of 
men and women, rather than as expressions of a stereotyped concept that may 
be readily understood. For it is often tempting to forget that in the early modern 
period the universality of social norms and the cultural unity of the human race 
were axiomatic notions, so that, as Anthony Pagden has explained, any attempt 
to interpret or to understand 'the other' would have been unthinkable. Even the 
genuine interest in local cultures that can be detected in such writers as the 
Dominican Bartolome de las Casas, the Franciscan Bernardino de Sahagun or 
the Jesuit Jose de Acosta, was not part of any attempt to fight 'eurocentric 
prejudices' in favour of a more objective or 'enlightened' view of the American 
reality. On the contrary, those 'prejudices' were an integral part of the 
contemporary vision of the world, and to abandon them would have seemed to 
them not only dangerous and heretical, but intellectually absurd. It cannot be 
stressed enough, therefore, that the aim of the missionaries was not to 
understand 'the other', but to evaluate the Indians in order to eliminate their 
'otherness', thereby allowing their incorporation into the conceptual edifice of 
Christendom.5 And since the idea of the devil was central to this conceptual 
edifice, it is logical to expect it to have played an equally central role in the 
missionaries' approach to native cultures. 
On the other hand, when considering the early modern devil and particularly 
his 'arrival' in the New World, there is the opposite tendency to lay too much 
emphasis on the enormity of his power and to ignore the more malleable and 
oscillating image of him that was still common in pre-Reformation days. For 
if it is true that Satan and his legion of assistant demons figured largely in the 
early chronicles and that indigenous deities were from the start identified with 
demons, such images were often closer to a world of fantasy, where demons 
appeared in the same context as mermaids, giants, and even saints and angels, 
than to the more terrifying climate that would come to characterise the 
European witch-hunts.6 In spite of the undeniable growth of diabolism in pre-
Reformation days, most people still conceived of the devil as a subordinate 
creature of God who had been cast down to eternal punishment and doubly 
defeated in the death and resurrection of Christ. Thus, just as medieval mystics 
like Julian of Norwich felt free to ridicule and mock the devil, convinced of the 
intrinsic futility of all his actions, the early discoverers and missionaries were 
generally confident in the superiority of the Christian faith over demonic 
assaults and instigations. 
An illustrative expression of this confidence can be appreciated in Hernan 
Cortes's attitude towards the 'idolatrous' practices of the Indians. In contrast 
to the subsequent outright condemnation of all idolatry as intrinsically demonic, 
Cortes saw idolatry as a sin of ignorance and simplicity rather than as an act of 
positive wickedness. No matter how grave the sin of idolatry might be, it could 
always be set right by rational explanation and by suitable instruction. In his 
second Carta de Relation, signed in 1520 and sent to Charles V in an attempt 
to win his favour over the Council of the Indies, Cortes gave a surprisingly 
level-headed account of the 'idolatrous' practices of the Mexicans, recounting 
how he made it clear to Moctezuma and his companions that their man-made 
idols were not worthy of the worship due to the one true God of the Christians. 
But the response that he put in the mouths of the Indians is even more 
revealing: 
...and everyone, especially the said Moctezuma, replied that ... owing to the 
very long time that had passed since the arrival of their ancestors to these 
lands, it was perfectly possible that they could be mistaken in their beliefs ... 
and that I, as a recent arrival, should know better the things that they should 
hold and believe.7 
There can be little doubt about the imaginary nature of this passage, 'more of 
a story, a means of inventing a fable to serve his purpose by an astute, wise and 
artful captain', as Francisco Fernandez de Oviedo would later remark.8 What 
is significant, however, is Cortes's firm conviction that the Indians were normal 
human beings, whose level of civilisation was 'almost the same as the 
Spanish',9 and whose 'errors', far from being the result of direct demonic 
intervention, were more due to human weakness and susceptible to being set 
right through rational argument and a good disposition. That this attitude was 
not just intended as a means to gain Charles V's favour can be deduced from 
the way in which Cortes put his idea into practice. According to Bernal Diaz 
del Castillo, whenever the Conqueror ordered the destruction of Indian 'idols' 
he invariably replaced them with crosses and images of the Virgin, often 
entrusting the very same Indians that had been responsible for the care and 
propitiation of the defeated idols with the care of the new Christian images.10 
This initiative reflected the Conqueror's hope that as soon as the Christian 
message was preached to the Indians they would naturally realise the errors of 
their ways and set their house in order. Implicit in this was Cortes's conviction 
about the intrinsic goodness of human nature. More than a 'splendid politico-
military alibi' as Carmen Bernand and Serge Gruzinski have called it,11 
Cortes's attitude to idolatry rather echoes Aquinas's thesis that grace does not 
destroy nature but perfects it. But even more than an incipient and rather naive 
form of Thomism, Cortes's perception of the native cultures of America reveals 
symptoms of that peculiar millenarianism that would soon come to inspire the 
Franciscan mission in the New World, a mission to which he lent his full 
support. 
The twelve Franciscans who arrived in Mexico in 1524, recruited at the 
specific request of Cortes from the recently founded, reformed province of San 
Gabriel de Extremadura, were animated by a fervent hope in the rebirth of the 
Church in the New World. Their ideals can be traced as far back as the 
thirtenth-century Franciscan missions to Asia led by John of Piano Carpini, 
William of Rubruck and John of Monte Corvino, whose hope had been the 
conversion of Mongols and Jews in an effort to defeat Islam and unite the 
world in Christ.12 At the time of the discovery of America, this idea had been 
given new impetus by the revival of interest in the prophecies of the twelfth-
century Benedictine abbot Joachim de Fiore, with his division of history into 
three Trinitarian stages: the age of the Old Testament, governed by God the 
Father; the age of the New Testament, governed by God the Son; and the age 
of the Millennium, governed by the Holy Spirit, when the terrestrial hierarchi-
cal church would be destroyed to clear the way for the monastic reign of pure 
charity.13 Through the efforts of Colette of Corbie and of Bernardino of Siena 
in particular, a more moderate version of this view was approved by both 
spiritual and observant Franciscans at the beginning of the sixteenth century. 
Into it was incorporated the Bonaventurean identification of St Francis with the 
angel of the Apocalypse who would unlock the seal of the sixth age to mark the 
beginning of the Joachite age of the Holy Spirit.14 
In this atmposphere, it is hardly surprising that the new continent should 
have been readi ly env i saged as the p r iv i l eged land of F ranc i scan 
millenarianism. In a world still imbued with that sense of disillusionment so 
finely portrayed by Huizinga as a characteristic theme of fifteenth-century 
Europe, many tended to seek refuge in the longing for a return to a better state 
of things.15 After the discovery, this longing could readily be transposed from 
a world remote in time to a world remote in space. The Golden Age ceased to 
be the monopoly of an idealised past and for some became firmly localised in 
the remote shores of the newly found lands.16 If the letters of Columbus and 
Vespucci are marked by connotations of fertility and abundance, and if 
humanists like Peter Martyr and Hernan Perez de Oliva could go so far as to 
contrast the innocence and nobility of the Indians with the barbarism of their 
European invaders, how much more would the Franciscans view the New 
World as the land destined to prepare the way for the Millennium? 
It is in this context that the best sense can be made of the 'sun-lit euphoric 
quality' of the first years of evangelisation in New Spain which can be readily 
appreciated in the writings of Fray Toribio de Motolinia and which still haunts 
the precincts of churches at Huejotzingo, Acolman and Tzintzuntzan.17 The 
ease with which the Indians seemed to convert to Christianity was enough to 
convince the friars not just that God was on their side but, more specifically, 
that the devil was clearly on the losing side. Indeed, if the chronicles represent 
an accurate account, the conversion of the Indians appears to have been carried 
out in the midst of an enthusiasm submerged in ritual euphoria. With the 
parishes administered by the religious and with the bishops appointed from the 
mendicant orders themselves, the new church felt unhampered by the wealth 
and pomp which afflicted its European counterpart and saw itself as a worthy 
successor of the early church of the Apostles. This conviction had been 
reinforced by the way in which thousands of Indians had flocked to hear the 
Christian message and had submitted readily to baptism. According to 
Motolinia, some of the Franciscans baptised as many as 1500 Indians in one 
day, so that they were often 'unable to raise the pitcher ... because their arm 
was tired'.18 Additionally, the liturgical calendar was exploited to the full, 
with elaborate rounds of processions, dances, feasts, outdoor masses, penitential 
sessions and passion and nativity plays being eagerly devised to replace the 
pagan ceremonies. In the process, the virtues of the Indians were celebrated in 
the light of the Franciscan Order's own ideals: their relative poverty, their 
exiguous diet and their obedient, phlegmatic and docile nature being seen as 
clear signs of evangelical simplicity. The devil's reign in the New World 
seemed to have reached a very low ebb. 
Conversion and disillusionment: the Devil's re-emergence 
If optimism was the dominant mood during the first years of evangelisation, it 
never, however, went unchallenged. Indeed, from the early days of the 
discoveries, the theme of the primeval innocence of the Indians ran parallel to 
the no less arresting conviction of their bestial nature and of the demonic 
character of their culture and religion. Among many others, Dr Chanca, 
Columbus's famous companion in his second voyage, referred to their 
'bestiality' as 'greater than that of any beast in the world'.19 For his part, in 
his brief account of the Conquest of Mexico, Francisco de Aguilar stated that 
'there could not exist a kingdom in the world where the devil was honoured 
with such reverence';20 and in a more extreme example the historian Gonzalo 
Fernandez de Oviedo boldly averred that 'Satan ... [had been] banished from 
these lands ... with the destruction of the lives of the majority of the Ind-
ians'.21 
Such observations shed some light on the considerably more cautious 
approach to conversion favoured by the Dominicans, and help to make sense 
of the criticisms that they levelled against the Franciscans upon their arrival in 
1526. On what appears a more realistic note, the Dominican friars were 
sceptical and critical of the Franciscan approach to baptisms en masse, insisting 
on the need for careful instruction in the basic principles of the faith before the 
administration of baptism and the other sacraments. Nor was it too long before 
their observations began to ring true. For, despite the destruction and 
confiscation of idols, it was soon discovered that clandestine native practices 
and the native calendar with its pagan ceremonies continued to regulate the 
lives of many Indians. Even Motolima's millenarian optimism could not ignore 
the presence of a devil who was 'served with great idolatries' and 'appeared 
many times to the priests who served the idols'.22 The Indians, he wrote 
elsewhere, concealed idols wherever they could, even 'at the foot of the crosses 
or beneath the stones of the altar steps, pretending that they were venerating the 
cross, when they were in fact adoring the devil'.23 To this initial disillusion-
ment was soon added the cyclical onslaught of European epidemics, against 
which the Indians had no natural resistance, and which began to decimate the 
native population at the same time as the Spanish settlers were increasing their 
demand for labour and the tax policies of the Spanish monarchy were eroding 
the economic basis of the Indian aristocracy. These developments had a 
demoralising effect on the Indian community, which reverted increasingly to 
drunkenness, while the mendicants themselves became subject to attacks from 
a secular clergy eager to regain lost ground. By the mid-1530s it had become 
clear that the conversion of the Indians had been a very superficial affair. 
Idolatry was deemed so widespread that the Franciscan Archbishop of Mexico, 
Fray Juan de Zumarraga, in sharp contrast with the policies of his co-religion-
ists, saw fit to implement the first inquisitorial practices against idolatrous and 
superstitious Indians. 
Few moments in history are filled with more bitter irony. The thought of a 
Franciscan friar, who was also a humanist, conversant with the writings of 
Erasmus and author of a treatise which spelled out Christian doctrine in simple 
language, acting out the role of Inquisitor general, engaged in a ruthless and 
frantic persecution of unfaithful Indian apostates which culminated in the 
burning at the stake of the charismatic Indian leader, the Cacique de Texcoco, 
Don Carlos Chichimecatecuhtli, would have seemed like a very bad kind of 
nightmare to the early missionaries.24 And yet it is difficult to imagine an 
alternative course of action open to the Archbishop. After all, the Indians were 
no longer innocent pagans awaiting Christian enlightenment, but proper 
Christians, baptised and allegedly instructed, and therefore subject to the same 
disciplinary treatment that was used in Europe against the sins of idolatry, 
heresy and apostasy. All these crimes were clearly widespread and thriving 
among the Indians. Idols were constantly being hidden in caves not just with 
the purpose of protecting them against the fury of the missionaries, but in order 
to allow the Indians to continue their sacrifices 'in the gentile fashion'. Human 
sacrifice, although less frequent, lingered on, and it was very common to find 
young men with their legs cut open or with wounds in their ears and tongues 
inflicted with the purpose of providing human blood for the idols. The more 
innocent ceremonies left remnants of sacrificed hens and evidence that the 
rituals had been accompanied by song, dances and extreme drunkenness.25 
More alarming were a number of similariites that could be detected between 
Christian practices and native rites. Fasting, for instance, was an indispensable 
prelude to the sacrifices which, as a rule, ended in a communal banquet when 
the participants would eat the flesh of the sacrificed animals and drink the 
pulque, or 'wine of the earth', that had been offered to the idol.26 Few could 
fail to notice the striking resemblance between this practice and the Christian 
observance of fasting prior to the celebration of the Eucharist. The similarity 
became even more alarming when the Indians accompanied their 'communion' 
with the ingestion of teunanacatl (hallucinogenic mushrooms) which, as 
Motolinia explained to the Count of Benavente, meant literally 'the flesh of 
god', 'or of the devil whom they adore', and which, according to another 
witness, took the Indians 'out of their senses, making them have demonic 
visions'.27 
The intellectual difficulties that such similarities provoked among the 
mendicants would be difficult to exaggerate. For even more important than their 
belief in the universality of European cultural values was the missionaries' faith 
in the unique and universal vocation of the Christian church. Any attempt to 
relativise these similarities through an exercise in what we might call 
'comparative religion' would have seemed to them not merely unthinkable but 
positively sacrilegious. If the Christian sacraments were believed to have been 
established by Christ himself as material channels of supernatural grace, how 
could they possibly find such striking parallels in the idolatrous rites of remote 
pagans? At best the phenomenon could be explained as the result of a 
mysterious initiative on the part of God to prepare the Indians for the reception 
of the Gospel: a kind of prelude to what was to come. This indeed had been 
Motolinia's hope when confronted with some infant bathing ceremonies which 
seemed to him to resemble baptism. 'Those baptised in such manner' - he 
explained - 'were exhorted to struggle with the enemies of the soul and to 
sweep and clean their consciences ... thereby preparing the way for Christ to 
come to them in baptism'.28 But such hopes were not easy to hold in face of 
the more frequent orgiastic ceremonies that were encountered and which 
seemed to the friars to represent a form of pseudo-sacramentalism imbued with 
Satanic inversion. 
Zumarraga's change of attitude towards the Indians was not, therefore, as 
dramatic as it might appear at first sight. For it clearly responded to a growing 
awareness of the threatening reality of Satanic intervention in Indian cultures, 
a reality that had begun to be discerned beneath the crumbling optimism of the 
second decade of evangelisation and which had become dominant even among 
such dedicated friars as the famous Bernardino de Sahagun. Indeed, it is 
ironically in this mood of increasing disillusionment with Indian cultures that 
the foundation of the College of Santa Cruz de Tlaltelolco must be understood. 
As Sahagun explains, just as 'the physician cannot with certainty apply the 
medicine needed by the patient without first knowing from what humour or 
cause the illness proceeds', so the preachers and confessors, who are the 
'physicians of souls', must study the ways in which 'the sins ... and the rites ... 
and the superstitions ... and the ceremonies of idolatry', which 'have not yet 
fully disappeared', were practised by the Indians.29 Echoing St Augustine's 
description of pagan deities as 'useless images or unclean spirits and malignant 
demons',30 Sahagun insisted that the deities of the Indians 
were not gods, but lying and deceitful devils; and if it be thought that these 
things are so forgotten and lost, and that faith in one God is so well planted 
and firmly rooted among these natives that there is no need to speak about 
them, ... I am also certain that the Devil neither sleeps nor has forgotten the 
cult that these Indian natives offered him in the past, and that he is awaiting 
a suitable conjuncture to return to his lost lordship; ... it is prudent, therefore, 
to be on our guard.31 
Accordingly, Sahagun never tired of warning his co-religionists against any 
easy enthusiasm that they might feel about the similarities between Christian 
and pagan religious practices. Hence his denunciation of the growing popularity 
of the cult of Our Lady of Guadalupe - who had come to be venerated in the 
same place as the native goddess Tonantzin - as a 'satanic invention'. How 
could it be, he asked, that 'everywhere in the land there can be found churches 
in honour of Our Lady, and the Indians do not go to them, but come from far 
distances to this Tonantzin, just as they used to in old times'?32 
It is true that behind this growing uncertainty, something of the original 
optimism of the missionaries could still be detected. Even after the disillusion-
ment of seeing the Indians revert to their idolatrous practices and of realising 
that their alleged simplicity and innocence had been grossly misinterpreted, the 
Franciscans could still fall back on authoritative interpretations of idolatry 
which left Indian cultures relatively unscathed. One such interpretation had 
been offered centuries before by Isidore of Seville who, following Ehumerus, 
had ascribed the origin of idolatry to the common human experience of 
bereavement that tended to seek expression in a longing for the loved and lost. 
Isidore's view had been popularised in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
through the widely distributed translations of De Propietatibus Rerum, a 
thirteenth-century treatise by the Franciscan Bartholomew Anglicus,33 and it 
found a clear echo among some of the founders of the College of Santa Cruz. 
Writing to Charles V, for instance, Fray Jacobo de Testera emphasised that the 
Indians' 'rites of idolatry and the adorations of their false gods and their 
ceremonies and sacrifices, however evil, are born of a natural desire that seeks 
succour but fails to find an efficacious remedy'.34 Others could base similar 
remarks upon simple appeals to common sense that made any recourse to 
authority superfluous. 'We too', wrote Jeronimo Lopez to Charles V in 1545, 
come from gentile peoples, and we too were defeated, conquered and 
subjected, and we were subjected to the Romans and we rejected them and 
rebelled and were converted to baptism, and have been so a much greater 
number of years than them, and still we are not good Christians. What then 
are we asking of these so short a time after their conversion?35 
But these hopes were a mere flicker of the earlier enthusiasm. By the middle 
of the century there could be little doubt that the growing tide of pessimism had 
triumphed, and that with it there had also emerged an enhanced and consider-
ably more compelling image of the devil and the diabolic. Already in 1567, the 
Franciscan Fernando de Arbolancha could write to the Council of the Indies 
attacking the old idea of the innocence and simplicity of the Indians; and a few 
years later, the Franciscan Provincial of Guatemala, Fray Bernardino Perez, 
urged the Council to legislate in favour of the policy of Indian Hispanisation, 
stating that a negative decision in this respect would 'cause much evil and even 
hint at a certain diabolical ambition', because 'just as the devil had encouraged 
the confusion of tongues in order to keep men under his power, so the 
particular ambitions of some want to continue it'.36 
A clear change had taken place. Whereas Sahagun's deep concern with the 
influence of the devil on the Indians had expressed itself in a detailed and 
meticulous investigation of their cultures, his immediate successors seemed 
convinced that Indian cultures were too dangerous to merit such study. 
It would be tempting to explain this change as the result of the missionary 
disillusionment with the process of conversion. But, although this factor 
undoubtedly played a part, the change was too wide-ranging to be explained 
away so simply. In fact, the new attitude soon transcended the missionary 
sphere and was seen to descend like a thick fog into every statement officially 
or unofficially made about Indian cultures. While, for instance, the growing 
mistrust of indigenous cultures led the Crown to insist in 1550 that Spanish be 
taught to Indians so as to 'avoid the great dissonances and imperfections that 
native tongues are naturally prone to', a certain Tomas Lopez complained from 
Guatemala about the diffusion of Nahuatl, 'which I understand to have been 
and to be an invention of the devil'.37 
It should, of course, be remembered that at this time such statements were 
conditioned by a new set of instrumental assumptions about the practice of 
Empire. The New World was no longer the millenarian dream of the first 
Franciscans, but a substantial part of an imperial system which conceived itself 
as a single and universal community. As such, it aimed to be governed by the 
same unity and respect for the same laws, and clearly the mere export of a body 
of legislation was insufficient to achieve this. The monarch, in fact, had to 
attempt a true 'acculturation' - or, to use a less anachronistic term, Hispani-
sation - of his subjects. The prime instrument in this process was obviously 
language, for it was a humanistic commonplace that those who control the 
means of persuasion control the means of power. As Antonio de Nebrija had 
told Queen Isabella as early as 1492 when he presented her with his Spanish 
grammar, 'language is the instrument of Empire'.38 
There was, therefore, nothing startlingly new or revolutionary about the 
Crown's policy of Hispanisation that emerged around the middle of the 
sixteenth century. What was surprising was the way in which the policy seemed 
to carry so much conviction, even among those missionaries who only a few 
years earlier would have been at pains to oppose Hispanisation, as well as the 
way in which it was accompanied by a conspicuously pessimistic perception of 
Indian cultures which gave the devil a much more prominent role. It is true 
that, as a rule, the two aspects of the problem tended to go hand in hand. As 
Sabine MacCormack has suggested, whenever Christianity is backed by the 
State, conversion tends to adopt a pattern which entails a rejection of all earlier 
ways of worship and thought as inimical to the new religion. Such a pattern of 
the mechanisms of conversion, which follows the age-old directives of 
Tertullian and Ambrose - the first Christian thinkers to be backed by the 
Roman empire - , is in clear contrast with the alternative approach advocated 
by Clement of Alexandria and Origen, according to whom the pagan religions 
enshrined much of what was to be learnt more concretely in Christianity.39 
And indeed, as soon as Christian conversion became a specific concern of the 
Spanish state and was thus taken away from the exclusive sphere of the 
missionaries, it ceased to be a matter of assent based on reason and argument 
and it became a matter of acquiescence based on faith, authority and tradition. 
In this context, it is natural to expect the diabolic to have been given an 
active role as a useful means in the struggle for power. Indeed, the devil's 
influence tended to increase in the perceptions of the friars vis-a-vis the Indians 
in a way analogous to the way in which it had increased in, say, the perceptions 
of St Augustine vis-a-vis the Romans. But a problem remains even after this 
point is granted. For despite St Augustine's insistence on the vast power of 
Satan and his demons - whom he saw as 'a species of beings superior to men, 
living for ever, their bodies as active and as subtle as the air, endowed with 
supernatural powers of perception; and, as fallen angels, the sworn enemies of 
the true happiness of the human race'40 - he nevertheless always placed their 
power in the context of God's omnipotence. Indeed, God had shown his 
omnipotence most clearly in the way in which he always restrained the powers 
of the devil, who, otherwise, would obliterate the whole Christian church.41 
Accordingly, St Augustine revealed the demonic undertow of the pagan past 
with the purpose of exorcising it. By blaming the devil for whatever seemed 
barbarous or despicable in pagan history he justified the secular aspects of the 
pagan past and enhanced their intrinsic value. 
By contrast, the Spanish missionaries and officials who supported the 
Crown's policy of Hispanisation seemed, from the middle of the century, to be 
stressing the allegedly demonic nature of Indian religions with the purpose of 
condemning them outright. This was a very different approach to the demonic 
in Christian thought which cannot be adequately understood outside the context 
of contemporary European intellectual developments. Before we can continue, 
therefore, we must make a necessary digression that will allow us to understand 
the ideological developments taking place on the other side of the Atlantic 
where, as we shall see, the perceptions of the diabolic were undergoing a 
significant transformation. 
The European background: 
Moralists, Nominalists and Reformers 
By the time of the Reformation, the chief characteristics of the demonic that 
would go into the making of the early modern European devil had been known 
for many centuries. Already in the New Testament the devil could be perceived 
as the personification of evil: a being who did physical harm to people by 
attacking or possessing their bodies, who tempted them, and who accused and 
punished sinners. In contrast to the rabbinic tradition, which had tended to limit 
the concept of the devil, the early Christians seem to have expanded and 
strengthened it by identifying Satan and his demons with the fallen angels. In 
doing this, they not only removed the devil decidedly from his previous divine 
origin, but they actually clarified the nature and the ranks of good and evil 
angels and the extent of their power over nature and over men. Just as a natural 
theology could be argued from the human experience of the good, the early 
Christians attempted to argue a natural diabology from the human experience 
of evil.42 
The importance that the devil came to acquire in Christian thought can be 
seen both in the thought of philosophers, like Origen - one of the first Christian 
thinkers to identify Satan with Isaiah's Day star43, with Ezechiel's Prince of 
Tyre44 and with Job's Leviathan45 - and, more vividly, in the teachings of the 
monks of the desert, for whom demonic temptations provided an ideal 
opportunity to take part in the cosmic struggle between Christ and Satan, and 
whose copious hagiographies added colour and detail to the personifications of 
evil.46 
Yet a marked confidence in the power of the Church against the various 
demonic instigations was always effectively preserved. This was largely due to 
the way in which Christian thinkers had from the earliest days insisted upon the 
devil's complete subservience to God. Hermas, Polycarp and Plutarch taught 
that the devil had no power over the human soul; Justin Martyr, that the devil 
was a creature of God, with an essentially good nature which he had merely 
deformed through his own free will;47 and Irenaeus and Tertullian, that the 
devil's powers over men were limited, since he could not force them to sin 
against their will. The view that evil was not an independent principle was to 
be reinforced by the Alexandrians Clement and Origen, who were among the 
first to assert that evil does not exist in itself48 and whose teachings would in 
turn prepare the ground for St Augustine's classic definition which denied evil 
all ontological existence.49 
If evil had no substance, no actual existence, no intrinsic reality; if nothing 
was by nature evil; then a principle of evil - an evil being independent from 
God - was an absurdity. It would be impossible to exaggerate the strength of 
this philosophical principle in medieval Christian thought. It can be seen at 
work even in those areas furthest removed from philosophy. The vivid and 
frightening devil which characterised monastic sermons and exempla, for 
example, was effectively toned down in popular folklore by making him appear 
ridiculous or impotent. Thus, the stories of Gregory of Tours in sixth-century 
Gaul follow the guidelines of Evagrius Ponticus and John Cassian in aiming to 
be amusing and light and in invariably leading to happy endings in which the 
saints triumphed over their demonic adversaries, often in a humorous way, 
thereby encouraging the development of a trivial and comic image of the devil 
in popular literature.50 Even the more strictly theological or juridical express-
ions of the Christian struggle against Satan, which were vividly represented in 
the exorcisms of the possessed, were much more than the complex 'psycho-
dramas' that the modern student is apt to imagine. As Peter Brown has 
suggested, exorcism was held to be the one irrefutable sign of praesentia - the 
physical presence of the holy - in the great basilicas of Catholic Gaul. It was 
'the one demonstration of the power of God that carried unanswerable 
authority'.51 
There could be little doubt here of the devil's total subservience to God and 
of his complete inability to do anything against God's will. Even inside the 
cloister, where the devil was seemingly given a much freer hand, the monastic 
liturgical life was designed to represent a continual battle against Satan and his 
army of demons. However difficult or potentially demoralising the struggle 
might have seemed, it was none the less motivated by the firm conviction that 
God would inevitably triumph. 
How, then, was it possible for this unflinching confidence to be so drastically 
shaken in the middle of the sixteenth century? It is clear that any attempt to 
answer this question would be incomplete and well beyond the scope of this 
paper. My aim in this section is merely to point to a few significant develop-
ments in late medieval thought that, in my view, help to clarify the intellectual 
motives for the change of attitude that we detected in the European interpreta-
tion of Amerindian cultures. 
The Ten Commandments 
As a modern historian has suggested, the first signs of the notion of the devil 
that would become dominant in the early modern period can be traced back to 
the Gregorian reforms of the late eleventh century when, in their attempt to 
reform the world from the vantage point of monasticism, the reformers 
encouraged a transposition of monastic spirituality from the cloister into the 
secular world. Since the secular world lacked the liturgical defences of the 
monastery, the motives and ideals that had led to the development of the 
monastic devil associated with sermons, exempla and hagiographies, adopted 
a very different existence in the untrained minds of the secular clergy and lay 
people.52 As a result, quite independently of the rise in manifestations of 
dissent at this time - notably the Cathar movement - which indeed helped to 
sharpen the sense of the world's vulnerability to demonic influence, a sense of 
helplesness against demonic instigations began to be felt in more personal and 
direct ways. Already in the writings of the Cistercian mystic and historian 
Cesarius of Heisterbach (c. 1180-1240), it is clear that demons had become no 
mere external enemies doomed to be defeated by the bearers of a militant faith, 
but that they had penetrated into every corner of life and, above all, into the 
souls of individual Christians. More than the causes of droughts or epidemics, 
demons had come to be regarded, outside as well as inside the cloister, as the 
instigators of interior desires that individuals could not acknowledge as 
belonging to themselves.53 
This trend was no doubt linked to the growing mood of spiritual introspec-
tion that gathered momentum towards the end of the medieval period. It was 
especially marked by the growing emphasis on domestic piety and by a 
widespread urge to achieve a more vivid and dramatic identification of 
individual religious experiences with the sufferings of Christ, as expressed most 
typically in the flagellant movements. But, as John Bossy has interestingly 
pointed out, the new trend was also linked to a curious change of emphasis in 
late medieval perceptions of sin and penance from a moral system based on the 
Seven Deadly Sins to one based on the Ten Commandments.54 As Bossy 
explains, the traditional moral system taught throughout the medieval period 
was based on the seven 'deadly' or 'capital' sins: pride, envy, wrath, avarice, 
gluttony, sloth and lust - usually in that order. Although the list was not 
Christian, but Greek and possibly astrological in origin, it had been given 
authority by St Gregory the Great and it could be related to the moral teaching 
of the New Testament by viewing it as a negative exposition of Jesus's twofold 
commandment to love God and one's neighbour. The system had many 
advantages. Not only did the Seven Sins fit into a whole string of septenary 
classifications - the seven sacraments, the seven works of mercy, the seven 
petitions of the Paternoster, etc. - which made them easy to remember; they 
were also easy to represent visually and, perhaps more importantly, they 
provided a set of categories under which people could identify passions of 
hostility, which at this time were the most vigorous, as un-Christian. In Bossy's 
words, the system 'taught fairly effectively a social or community ethics'.55 
Yet the system had the disadvantage of making little of obligations to God 
and, more worrying still, of having no scriptural authority. It is consequently 
not surprising to find the scholastic theologians of the thirteenth century 
attempting to build their treatments of Christian ethics around the Decalogue. 
And as the new system, based on the Ten Commandments, came to replace the 
old one, based on the Seven Sins, new perceptions of morality came to the fore 
whose effects, in Bossy's words, 'may fairly be described as revolutionary'.56 
Perhaps the most significant of these effects was a notable enhancement of 
the status of the devil. By treating idolatry as the primary offence that a 
Christian could commit, the Decalogue led to a change from the traditional role 
of the devil as the anti-type of Christ - the 'Fiend' who taught men to hate 
rather than to love - to his new role as the anti-type of God the Father: the 
source and object of idolatry and false worship. By analogy, whereas 
traditionally witchcraft had been seen as the offence of causing malicious harm 
to others - it is interesting, for instance, to note that in Chaucer's exposition it 
had been dealt with, rather loosely, under wrath - in the new context it became 
a clear offence against the First Commandment. So too, just as the phenomenon 
of Carnival could in the old context be explained as an inverted image of the 
traditional machinery of penance derived from a moral system based on the 
Seven Sins, in the new context, the phenomenon of the witch could be 
explained as an inverted image of a moral system founded on the Ten 
Commandments, particularly the first. 
It is no accident, therefore, that in proportion as the Ten Commandments 
became established as the accepted system of Christian ethics, the spell of the 
witch syndrome, which went hand in hand with an enhanced status of the 
diabolic, proved increasingly persuasive.57 
The Via Moderna 
If the gradual acceptance of the Ten Commandments as the basis for the moral 
system of Christendom was central to the identification of diabolism with 
idolatry in the late Middle Ages, a question that immediately springs to mind 
is why the new attitude only became dominant in the middle of the sixteenth 
century. As we have seen, at the time of the discovery of America, it was still 
common for the vast majority of people to feel confident in the power of the 
Church against demonic instigations. The attitudes of Cortes and Motolinia 
were not exceptional and they find parallels in isolated incidents recorded 
among widely different groups. In 1536, for instance, an Indian woman from 
Chilapa (now in eastern Guerrero) was allegedly taken by the devil to the top 
of a mountain to ask her to 'recognise him and adore him as her God', 
whereupon she simply slapped his face and went back down. That same year, 
the devil was reported to have appeared to the young Spaniard Maese Juan in 
an island after a shipwreck while he was urinating in the middle of the night, 
'blowing smoke through his nose and fire throw his eyes, with clawed feet, the 
tail of a bat and two horns'. Far from feeling helpless at the sight of this 
typically medieval vision, Maese Juan quickly made the sign of the cross and 
the devil promptly ran away in a fright.58 
Such confidence was in many ways a reflection of the marked scepticism, 
still widespread in pre-Reformation days, about the extent of the influence that 
the devil could exercise over the human will and over the natural world. 
Natural magicians like Ficino and alchemists like Paracelsus and Giordano 
Bruno might be firm believers in a nature filled with demons and charged with 
magical forces. But these beliefs did not contribute to the growth of diabolism, 
as Lucien Febvre once claimed.59 For rather than being the supernatural 
servants of Satan, the Neoplatonist demons were natural entities, perfectly 
amenable to human control. It is true that, on the other side of the philosophical 
spectrum, Aristotelians were in general happy to accept demonic causation in 
natural events through such phenomena as 'occult' qualities. But even among 
such notable Aristotelians as the famous Paduan lawyer Ulrich Miiller, the 
belief was firmly held that witches were not the servants of the devil but simply 
the victims of poverty or despair or village hatreds. So too, Agostino Nifo, 
Pope Leo X's physician, affirmed that in a truly Aristotelian universe there was 
no room for demons, and Pietro Pomponazzi averred that all the marvels 
ascribed to demons were always the result of a different cause, that apparitions 
were natural phenomena and that people who claimed to be 'possessed' were 
merely melancholic. Similar opinions were voiced by contemporary lawyers 
like Andrea Alciati and Gianfrancesco Ponzinibio, philosophers like Cornelius 
Agrippa and Giorlamo Cardano, physicians like Antonio Ferrari and even 
Franciscan scholastics like Samuel de Cassini.60 
It is true that for the most part this kind of scepticism was associated with 
what Hugh Trevor-Roper once called 'the purified Aristotelianism of the 
University of Padua', which was renowned for its attacks on the excesses of 
late medieval scholasticism,61 and that most early modern Aristotelians would 
have readily accepted demonic causation in nature. But it cannot be stressed 
enough that even among the most 'credulous' of Aristotelian scholastics, the 
firm belief in the devil's complete subservience to God was always effectively 
preserved. Even the authors of the Malleus maleficarum, a work commonly 
seen as the central theological work of the witch-hunts, were in fact at pains to 
stress that the real problem about witches was malefice, particularly malefice 
in relation to the sexual act and marriage, and not idolatry or devil-worship. It 
can thus be misleading to place the Malleus in the same tradition as the 
manuals of demonology that became common during the witch-hunts. For 
unlike these, the Malleus still saw witchcraft in the traditional sense, as a 
conspiracy against nature, charity and the human race, and not as a conspiracy 
of idolaters and devil-worshippers.62 Despite its undeniable influence during 
the witch prosecutions, the Malleus still managed to preserve the traditional 
confidence in the power of God and the Church against the attacks of the 
Enemy. 
By the middle of the sixteenth century such confidence had been noticeably 
diminished. Among the many reasons that can be given to explain this 
development, one that springs to mind from our current argument is the marked 
post-Reformation insistence on the importance of an ethical system with a 
scriptural basis, which inevitably led to the final endorsement of the Decalogue 
as the definitive moral system of Christianity on both sides of the confessional 
front. Just as Luther had done, the catechism of the Council of Trent would 
endorse the view that the Decalogue comprehended the entire moral obligations 
of Christians. Whereas earlier attempts had kept an important place for the 
Seven Sins, from now on these became clearly secondary to the Ten Command-
ments.63 
Nevertheless, it would not be too difficult to present the same argument in 
reverse. St Thomas Aquinas had, after all, built his treatment pf Christian ethics 
around the Decalogue. Yet, he had equally maintained not only that the 
Commandments were a compendium of natural law, but also that the natural 
law was valid independently of the Commandments. Aquinas's treatment of the 
Commandments was therefore an affirmation of the intrinsic goodness of nature 
independently of the effects of grace. And if nature was intrinsically good, even 
independently of whether God had willed it so or no, it is difficult to see how 
the devil, even through the operation of witches, could have had any arbitrary 
or uncontrollable influence upon it. Acceptance of the Decalogue, therefore, 
could also go hand in hand with the decline of the diabolic. This is what seems 
to have happened among the Aristotelians of Padua and, to some extent, as we 
have seen, the same attitude can even be detected in the Malleus maleficarum 
itself. 
The fact remains, however, that on this, as on many other issues, Aquinas's 
opinion did not carry the day. Medieval scholastics by and large tended to 
reject Aquinas's moral system and they were especially offended by its 
naturalistic bent. Duns Scotus and William of Ockham thought it inadmissible 
to bind God's moral decisions within a normative system which could be 
conceived as separate or distinct from God. Where Aquinas would have argued: 
God wills something because it is good, Scotus and Ockham would reverse the 
syllogism into: something is good because God wills it. This left no room for 
the possibility of a natural knowledge of God or even for the demonstrability 
of a natural religion. God's claims to absolute freedom and absolute power 
became so overwhelming that any human act's claim to goodness came to rely 
solely on the fact that God had commanded it so. Ethics thus ceased to be a 
matter of reason and became entirely dependent upon Revelation, which in turn 
became an arbitrary imposition, to be accepted with unreasoning submission 
and left without comment or explanation. In this way, the natural was 
necessarily separated from the supernatural, and the concordance between 
nature and grace lost its relevance.64 
Taking into consideration the general climate of late medieval spirituality, 
and particularly its mystical and introspective tendencies, it is not difficult to 
understand why the via moderna - as 'Nominalism' or 'Ockhamism' was 
known - should have proved more attractive than the via antiqua of the 
Thomists. If not Ockham, certainly Scotus claimed more followers than 
Aquinas between 1350 and 1650. Significantly among these were the members 
of the University of Paris, where Cardinal Pierre D'Ailly gave the doctrine the 
seal of his authority and passed it on to his brilliant pupil Jean Gerson. 
It is thus among Gerson and his circle that the inspirational sources of early 
modern demonology are to be sought.65 Widely regarded as one of the most 
influential thinkers in the century before the Reformation, Gerson effectively 
expounded the doctrine of the Ten Commandments from the perspective of 
Nominalism rather than Thomism. It is no accident that it was during his years 
as Chancellor of the University of Paris that the famous decision was reached 
by the faculty of theology in 1398 that all strictly maleficent witchcraft, as well 
as all seemingly beneficent counterwitchcraft, were in fact idolatrous, since 
they necessarily entailed apostasy and submission to the devil. A tireless 
propagator of the Decalogue as the system of Christian ethics, Gerson could 
only see witchcraft as a sin of idolatry; but since he was also convinced about 
the philosophical soundness of the via moderna, he did not have the defences 
of the Thomists who could base themselves on the doctrine of the intrinsic 
goodness of nature to deny the devil the possibility of exercising any arbitrary 
power over it. In contrast to the Thomist position, the Nominalist separation of 
nature and grace seemed to increase the devil's power in proportion as it 
increased the arbitrariness of God's will. 
It is true that outside Germany - where the influence of Gerson can be 
detected on Johannes Nider's Formicarius (c. 1430) and Johannes Geiler's Die 
Emeis (1516) - any Gersonian influence on demonological treatises is difficult 
to establish. Nevertheless, it seems safe to suggest without exaggeration that the 
general spirit of early modern demonology was immersed in the twofold 
acceptance of Nominalism as a philosophical system and of the Decalogue as 
a moral system. Indeed, even after Nominalism had become discredited by the 
attacks of humanists and reformers in the sixteenth century, the demonology 
that it had helped to establish had become too firmly rooted in Christian 
thought to be removed with any ease. Lutherans in particular could confidently 
assert that all maleficent effects were caused by the devil with divine 
permission, and, consequently, that witches were not workers of malicious harm 
but idolatrous disciples of the devil and contemners of God.66 But the same 
tendency proved equally persuasive among Catholics, even in spite of the 
Catechism of the Council of Trent's confirmation of Aquinas's view of the 
Commandments as a compendium of the natural law.67 
Nor is this apparent inconsistency surprising. For despite the existence of 
first rate Thomist commentators like the Dominicans Cajetan (1468-1534) and, 
especially, John of St. Thomas (1589-1644), the increasingly fragmented and 
intellectually eclectic theological debates that came to characterise the early 
modern period were fundamentally inimical to the traditional Thomistic 
conception of enquiry as a long-term, cooperative, pursuit of systematic 
understanding.68 If the theologians at Trent were willing to welcome Aquinas 
as a guide, they nevertheless reserved the right to a philosophical method that 
differed considerably from traditional Thomism. The most authoritative 
philosopher of the period, the Jesuit Francisco Suarez, for instance, formulated 
a philosophy that tended to an eclectic synthesis of the thought of Aquinas, 
Scotus and Ockham with the apologetic purpose of demonstrating that all 
Catholic thinkers were in agreement. The price of this attempt, as Pietro 
Redondi has written, 'was the abandonment of St. Thomas's theory of free will 
in order to admit direct knowledge of the individual'. In the philosophy of 
Suarez, therefore, 'there prevailed in respect of pure Thomism an Ockhamist 
opinion of the epistemological value of the singular and of the individual 
experience'.69 
The effects that this Ockhamist persistence in post-Trent Catholicism would 
have on subsequent demonological thought would be difficult to exaggerate. 
For the new position was fundamentally irreconcilable with Aquinas's theory 
of the human intelligence which, in turn, was the keystone of the Thomistic 
formulation of the concordance between nature and grace. In contrast to his 
Platonist predecessors, Aquinas had applied the principles of Aristotelian 
physics to the nature of man, teaching that matter was the principle of human 
individuation and that the soul was the form of the body. Hence man was not 
primarily a spiritual being confined in the 'prison' of the body, but a part of 
nature. And, likewise, human intelligence was not that of a pure spirit; it was 
'consubstantial' with matter, subject to the conditions of space and time, and 
only capable of knowing - ie, constructing an intelligible order - through the 
data of sensible experience systematised by reason.70 And yet this recognition 
of the dependence of human knowledge on sensible experience did not exclude 
Aquinas's philosophy from the world of spiritual reality. As Christopher 
Dawson once remarked: 
The intellectualism of St. Thomas is equally remote from an absolute idealism 
and a rationalist empiricism, from the metaphysical mysticism of the ancient 
East and from the scientific materialism of the modern West. It recognised the 
autonomous rights of the human reason and its scientific activity against the 
absolutism of a purely theological ideal of knowledge, and the rights of human 
nature and natural morality against the exclusive domination of the ascetic 
ideal.71 
It was the failure of early modern Thomists to preserve this balance that 
eventually opened the door of Catholicism to that 'alliance between Augustin-
ianism and Nominalism' which has been described by Heiko Oberman as a 
characteristic feature of Lutheranism.72 Certainly Suarez, in his attempt to 
restore scholastic metaphysics and epistemology, chose to become an 
Ockhamist in order to defeat sensist Ockhamism. In the process he formulated 
a philosophical method that denied hylomorphism. If it is true that Suarez 
affirmed the intellect's capacity to apprehend individual existents without 
reflection, the need to make a transition from apprehensions of essence to 
judgements of particular existence necessarily implied a complete separation 
of matter and spirit. (It is perhaps no accident that one of the most brilliant 
pupils of the Suarist Jesuits was Rene Descartes!)73 
It was thus this triumph of Nominalism which, when allied to the moral 
system of the Decalogue, made the post-Trent demonology - the demonology 
that would make its mark in the New World in the early sixteenth century and 
which found its inspiration in the works of theologians such as Martin de 
Castanega and, later, Martin del Rio - so fundamentally different from the 
demonology of the Malleus maleficarum. Malefice had ceased to be the centre 
of the problem and had given way to idolatry and devil-worship as the main 
objects of concern. And if it is true that this interiorisation of the crime of 
witchcraft effectively played against the actual practice of witch prosecution, 
it is no less true that it made the reality and the implications of diabolism much 
more immediate and compelling. 
This is certainly true of the demonology that first made its appearance in the 
New World. The rigour with which Zumarraga persecuted idolatrous Indians 
would have been unthinkable among his Franciscan predecessors. However, it 
becomes perfectly intelligible when we consider that Zumarraga had not come 
from the Province of San Gabriel de Extremadura and that any optimistic 
millenarianism that he could have shared with his co-religionists was 
overshadowed by his experiences in the Basque country, where in 1527 - only 
a year before his departure for Mexico - he had been sent by Charles V to 
investigate the resurgence of demonic activities.74 Perhaps the best way into 
Zumarraga's demonology is through the work of Fray Andres de Olmos, his 
closest aide both in the Basque country and in Mexico. For although Olmos had 
been 'converted' to millenarian optimism by Motolinfa soon after his arrival, 
he was sufficiently disappointed by the persistence of idolatry among the 
Indians in the 1530s and 1540s to persuade himself of the need to write a whole 
treatise in Nahuatl on Satanic witchcraft in the early 1550s.75 Based almost 
entirely on the earlier work of Fray Martin de Castanega,76 Olmos's central 
concern in this treatise was to establish that diabolism was not maleficent but 
idolatrous. Lapsed Indians could no longer be seen as gullible simpletons who 
had been deluded by the devil, or as malicious sorcerers who used demonic 
power to harm their fellow beings. Much more serious than this, Olmos 
asserted, idolatrous Indians were active devil-worshippers, members of a 
counter church set up by a devil anxious to be honoured like God. With this 
purpose Satan had set up his own church as a mimetic inversion of the Catholic 
Church. It had its 'execraments' to counter the Church's sacraments; it had its 
ministers, who were mostly women, as opposed to the predominance of male 
ministers in the Church; and it had its human sacrifices which sought to imitate 
the supreme sacrifice of Christ in the Eucharist.77 
It is difficult to appreciate the logic of this demonology unless we see it in 
the context of the Nominalist separation of nature and grace that, as we have 
seen, had come to dominate philosophical and theological thought at this time. 
As will become apparent from the thought of one of the most able and 
systematic thinkers to write about the New World in the sixteenth century, it 
is in the context of this Nominalist separation that the best sense can be made 
of the obsession with the diabolic that came to characterise European thought 
at this time, an obsession that would inevitably colour most European 
intrepretations of non-European religious expressions. 
The new demonology: Jose de Acosta 
The most competent exponent of post Reformation demonology in the New 
World is perhaps the brilliant Spanish Jesuit Jose de Acosta (1540-1600). A 
corpulent and melancholic figure of Jewish descent, Acosta was educated at the 
universities of Salamanca and Alcala de Henares, where already the Jesuits 
were beginning to challenge the Dominicans for mastery over the faculties of 
philosophy and theology. After completing his studies in Rome and teaching 
theology at the colleges of Ocana and Plasencia, he was sent to Peru, apparently 
on his own request, where he spent the next fifteen years, first as rector of the 
college of Lima, then as Provincial of the Society of Jesus and finally as 
consultant theologian of the Third Provincial Council in Lima. Ill health forced 
him to return to Europe in 1586. On his way back he stopped for a year in 
Mexico and was in close contact with his fellow Jesuit Juan de Tovar, who 
supplied him with most of the information on Ancient Mexico that would later 
appear in his Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias, a work published in 
Seville in 1590 and destined to win him immediate and enduring fame.78 
The particular significance of Acosta's work for our purpose lies in the 
clarity with which it highlights the permeation of Christian thought - even 
among those who, like Acosta himself, considered themselves to be in the 
mainstream of Thomist 'orthodoxy' - by the Nominalist separation of nature 
and grace. Indeed, the contrast between his treatment of what he regarded as 
'natural' and his analysis of what he thought to belong to the 'supernatural' 
sphere in the cultures of America is so striking that, at first sight, it is hard to 
believe that they are the constructs of the same mind. 
As far as the 'natural' sphere was concerned, Acosta's account of the native 
cultures of the New World was one of the most objective and original to have 
hitherto appeared. In easy, fluent style, the reader was provided with a concise 
and lucid exposition of the nature, origins and organisation of Indian cultures 
which clarified complex questions with confident and critical acumen. In a 
work that was very short by the standards of the day, the Jesuit left little doubt 
that he had assimilated the lessons of the Renaissance as far as style and 
perspective were concerned, 'at all points rejecting myth and authority in 
favour of observation and reason'.79 Despite his firm Aristotelianism he had 
no qualms about mocking Aristotle's meteorological assumptions "seeing that 
in the place where, and at the time when, according to his rules, everything 
should be on fire, I and all my companions were very cold'.80 He was equally 
critical of Aristotle's theory of slavery, asserting that natural slaves did not 
exist and that any slavish behaviour that might be observed among the Indians 
was the result of habit.81 Where previous writers had been content to revert 
to tradition or to ancient wisdom, Acosta insisted that empirical knowledge and 
experience should always take precedence over the doctrines of ancient 
philosophers in any examination of the causes and effects of natural phenom-
ena. Accordingly, native cultures had to be understood on their own terms. 
Comparisons with other races would only lead to absurd and inappropriate 
analogies. 'So long as they do not contradict the law of Christ and his Holy 
Church', he wrote, the Indians 
should be governed according to their own laws, the ignorance of which has 
led to many errors... For, when the judges and rulers are ignorant of the ways 
in which their subjects are to be judged and ruled, they not only inflict grief 
and injustice on them, but they also ... encourage them to abhor us as men 
who in all things, be they good or bad, have always opposed them.82 
This seemed a long cry from Zumarraga and Olmos and Sahagun. Indeed, 
Acosta's insistence on the urgency to assess Indian cultures on their own terms 
and his pursuit of causality and generality where his predecessors had been 
content with the mere observation and description of phenomena, in some ways 
resembled the purpose and method of modern science. It is no doubt this 
quality that gained Acosta the respect of William Robertson in the eighteenth 
century, when the Scotsman pronounced the Historia to be 'one of the most 
accurate and best informed writings concerning the West Indies', an opinion 
that found a recent echo when Anthony Pagden concluded that Acosta's work 
had made 'some kind of comparative ethnology, and ultimately some measure 
of historical relativism, inescapable'.83 
The fact that the devil had little or no room in this scheme was reflected in 
Acosta's frequent impatience with the opinions of 'ignorant friars' who 
imagined the whole of the Indian past as a diabolical hallucination.84 Rather 
than blaming the devil, Acosta was at pains to stress the natural goodness of 
Indian cultures. 'If anyone - he wrote - is amazed at the rites and customs of 
the Indians ... and detests them as inhuman and diabolical... let him remember 
that among the Greeks and the Romans one finds the same kind of crimes and 
often even worse ones'. So too, he reminded his readers that according to Bede, 
the Irish and the English, 'in their gentile days', had been no more enlightened 
than the Indians.85 In their refusal to abandon their ancient rites and customs 
the Indians were not necessarily playing into the hands of the devil. Rather, 
their behaviour was no different from that of the bulk of the Castilian peasantry 
who merely needed instruction to 'submit to the truth as a thief surprised in his 
crime'.86 
In all this, Acosta seemed poles apart from the demonology of his time. Even 
when dealing with the irksome question of conversion, Acosta's insistence on 
the need to preserve those pagan rites and ceremonies that did not conflict with 
Christianity87 seemed to echo St Gregory the Great's advice to St Augustine 
of Canterbury, and was in perfect tune with the current Jesuit missionary 
practice which produced its most illustrative representatives in China and India 
with Matteo Ricci and Roberto de Nobili. But Acosta was only willing to 
deploy such analytical acumen when dealing with natural phenomena or with 
cultural expressions that could be explained from a strictly natural standpoint. 
As soon as he entered the field of religion proper, all his insistence on 
empirical knowledge and analysis seemed to come to a complete standstill. To 
enter the sphere of the supernatural was to enter the sphere of theological 
certainty, where the divine law was the one and only standard of truth and 
where the divine will alone was sovereign. Thus, when faced with the curious 
similarities that existed between Christian and pagan religious practices, Acosta 
was as baffled as his predecessors. Unlike Motolinfa, however, he could find 
no room for providentialist hopes. Despite his conviction that in the wider 
structure of the divine plan good would always triumph over evil, when faced 
with Indian religions Acosta could not bring himself to anticipate God's 
intentions. To his mind, the evident similarities between Christian and pagan 
religious ceremonies necessarily pointed to a supernatural origin in the latter, 
and since it would be absurd to think of God as attempting to imitate himself, 
the only alternative source to account for such similarities had to be a diabolical 
one. 
It is true that Acosta, in Thomist fashion, would have accepted that man was 
capable of grasping religious truth by the mere encouragement of his own 
innate and natural desire for truth. But this desire seemed in itself insufficient 
to produce religious expressions that so closely resembled Christian religious 
practices, especially in milieux where Christianity had been totally unknown. 
Conversely, it was a commonplace in contemporary theological thought that 
Satan, the Simia Dei, was forever seeking to imitate his creator, so that, as 
Pedro Ciruelo had put it, 'the more saintly and devout the things he made men 
do, the greater was the sin against God'.88 From this it followed that the more 
highly structured was the social order of pagan peoples, and the more refined 
and complex was their civility and religious organisation, the more idolatrous 
and perverted were the results.89 
It was in his analysis of Indian religions, however, that the Nominalist 
separation of nature and grace was taken by Acosta, with impeccable logic, to 
its most extreme and dramatic conclusions. Defined in the book of Wisdom as 
the 'beginning cause and end of every evil', idolatry had always been regarded 
as the worst of all sins: the means through which the Prince of Lies, moved by 
pride and envy, had blinded men to the true shape of God's design for 
nature.90 Now, by denying paganism any natural means towards a supernatural 
end - unless, of course, both the means and the end could be classed as diabolic 
- Acosta effectively equated paganism with idolatry. Anything faintly religious 
in pagan cultures was necessarily the result of Satan's incorrigible mimetic 
desire.91 It was precisely this mimetic desire that was at the root of the 
existence of counter religious practices among the Indians of America. For the 
devil was constantly taking advantage of any opportunity that would allow him 
to imitate the divine cult. In America he had his own priests who offered 
sacrifices and administered sacraments in his honour. He had many followers 
who led lives of 'recollection and sham sanctity'. He had 'a thousand types of 
false prophets' through whom he sought to 'usurp the glory of God and feign 
light with darkness'. Indeed, there was 'hardly anything that had been instituted 
by Jesus Christ... which, in some way or other, the devil had not sophisticated 
and incorporated into their [the Indians'] heathendom'. In his attempt to imitate 
Catholic ritual Satan had distinguished between 'minor, major and supreme 
priests, and a type of acolyte', and had founded 'monasteries' where chastity 
was rigorously observed, 'not because of any love of cleanliness ... but because 
of his desire to deprive God, in any way that he can, of the glory of being 
served with integrity and cleanliness'. It was in the same spirit that Satan had 
encouraged 'penances and ascetic disciplines' in his honour, and sacrifices 
where he not only competed with the divine law, but actually tried to overstep 
it: for God had stopped Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, whereas Satan encour-
aged human sacrifices on a massive scale. His frantic mimetic desire had even 
culminated in a desperate attempt to imitate the mystery of the Trinity.92 
Such Satanic 'envy and urge to compete' became even more explicit in the 
devil's attempts to imitate the Christian sacraments. For he had instituted sham 
imitations of baptism, marriage, confession and sacerdotal unction. More 
histrionically, the Eucharist had been copied and mocked by the Mexicans in 
their rituals involving communal banquets which, in the May celebrations of the 
god Huitzilopochtli, reached the level of an elaborate parody of the feast of 
Corpus Christi: after a long procession, the feast culminated in the communal 
ingestion of a small idol made of maize pastry and honey. 'Who could fail to 
be astonished - Acosta exclaimed - that the devil should take so much care to 
have himself adored and received in the same way that Jesus Christ ... 
commanded and taught [to be received]!'.93 
Since, however, such similarities were a clear proof of the demonic nature 
of Indian religions, Acosta chose to overlook the chastity of the 'monasteries' 
and the asceticism of the 'penitential' practices and to stress that pagan 
religious ceremonies were invariably mixed with all types of 'abominations' 
that inverted and perverted the natural order. The unction of priests, for 
instance, was carried out with a substance amassed with every sort of 
'poisonous vermin', such as spiders, scorpions, snakes and centipedes, which, 
when burnt and mixed with the hallucinogen ololhiuqui, had the power of 
turning the newly ordained priests into witches who saw the devil, spoke to him 
and visited him by night in 'dark and sinister mountains and caves'. Similarly, 
the parody of the Eucharistic host was made from a mixture of human blood 
and amaranth seeds; the walls of the 'oratories' were always stained with blood 
and the long hair of the priests had been hardened by the clotted blood of 
sacrificial victims. Satanic pollution and ritual filth invaded every corner of 
Indian religion. A conscious inversion of the Christian ideals of sacramental 
purity and ritual cleanliness, their ritualism culminated in the incomparably 
offensive practice of human sacrifice which, in an unthinkably perverted 
fashion, was often accompanied by cannibalism. This was not merely an 
'unnatural crime' like sodomy and onanism; it was the ultimate expression of 
idolatry: its self-consuming nature associated it with Satanic desire itself.94 
In this account of Indian religions, Acosta made the Indians guilty of all the 
idolatrous aberrations listed in the book of Wisdom: 
With their child murdering initiations, their secret mysteries, their orgies with 
outlandish ceremonies, they no longer retain any purity in their lives... 
Everywhere a welter of blood and murder, theft and fraud, corruption, 
treachery, riots, perjury, disturbance ... pollution of souls, sins against nature 
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The contrast with his assessment of Indian cultures could not be more marked, 
and it becomes even more striking when we compare Acosta's method with the 
way in which his Dominican predecessor, Fray Bartolome de Las Casas, had 
dealt with the same problem a few decades earlier. For Las Casas's background 
and intellectual concerns were very similar to Acosta's. His thought, like 
Acosta's, had been moulded by the theological tradition of the School of 
Salamanca and, consequently, like Acosta, he had grounded his anthropology 
upon the premise that all human minds were the same in essence, that all men 
were innately susceptible to moral training, and that any analysis of cultural 
differences needed to be based on an historical explanation. Like Acosta, too, 
he had insisted on the primacy of empirical knowledge as the basis of any 
fruitful analysis of the American reality.96 Apart from their clear differences 
in style, structure and length, therefore, the thought of both writers and their 
appreciation of Indian cultures was surprisingly similar. The one essential 
difference between them was that, unlike Acosta, Las Casas did not appear to 
have been influenced by the Nominalist separation of nature and grace. This 
left him in freedom to approach the supernatural manifestations of Indian 
cultures from an essentially naturalistic standpoint. 
It is for this reason that we find no sharp contrast between the natural and the 
supernatural in the writings of Las Casas. Although he distinguished clearly 
between the two spheres, he thought it a mistake to separate them. Following 
Aquinas's dictum that grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, he 
concluded that the supernatural, albeit beyond human reason and understanding, 
was none the less as rational as the natural and that, consequently, any human 
desire for the supernatural was rooted in nature.97 Although he would have 
agreed with St Augustine, as Aquinas himself had done, that the original 
initiative always came from God, he was adamant that this did not do away 
with the essential goodness rooted in human nature itself. The desire for God 
- latria - was a universal and perfectly natural phenomenon which responded 
to an essential human need. By analogy, idolatria was not a demonic invention, 
but an equally natural - albeit disordered - phenomenon, responding to a 
natural desire for good and emerging from an error of reason caused by the 
ignorance and weakness of a fallen nature. Although a degeneration of the 
original latria, idolatry tended to be the rule, the 'natural' state, among the 
higher civilisations, whenever grace was absent. It could not, therefore, have 
a diabolical origin. No matter how disordered it might appear, or how much it 
might be used by the devil to perpetuate his perversities, the basic desire behind 
idolatry was essentially good: a proof, indeed, that the Indians were eager for 
evangelisation.98 
This, of course, did not mean that the devil was not as important for Las 
Casas as he was for Acosta. Indeed, the reality of Satanic intervention in human 
affairs was just as present in the writings of the Dominican as in those of the 
Jesuit, and it was often presented in an even more vivid and pervasive way. The 
devil was deemed to be constantly transporting men through the air and 
tempting witches to obtain unbaptised infants for their cannibalistic rites; he 
would also turn men into beasts; he would perform false miracles and he would 
constantly appear in human and animal forms." Yet all these demonic actions 
were set by Las Casas unquestionably in the context of malefice,100 and his 
demonology derived directly from the Thomist tradition that had inspired the 
authors of the Malleus malefic arum. 
Consequently, Las Casas's agreement with Aquinas on the question of the 
relation between nature and grace, which, as we have seen, allowed him to give 
a naturalistic explanation to the problem of idolatry, invested the devil with a 
justifying rather than a condemnatory role as far as Indian religious expressions 
were concerned. Where Acosta had initiated his discussion with a furious 
denunciation of Satan as the author and fount of idolatry, Las Casas began by 
invoking Aristotle's criteria for a true city, only moving to a discussion of 
religion once he had demonstrated the essential goodness of its natural 
foundations. If the devil was indeed the culprit of all native vices and crimes, 
he could easily be brought to heel once 'doctrine and grace' were made to work 
on the essentially good religious expressions of the Indians.101 In all this, Las 
Casas emerges as one of the last upholders of the Thomist doctrine of the 
concordance between nature and grace. His views on Indian religions were 
destined to become the last, desperate cry of an essentially medieval thinker. 
They had, ironically, much more in common with the optimism about human 
nature that we detected in the writings of his rivals, Cortes and Motolinia, than 
with the sombre pessimism that in his own life time he would see permeate 
Christian thought. 
Conclusion 
It has been one of the aims of this paper to show how the early modern eclipse 
of the Thomist dictum on nature and grace, which resulted from the prevailing 
influence of Nominalism on early modern thought, became central to Acosta's 
ambivalent analysis of the American reality. Without taking this factor into 
account, Acosta's work inevitably appears riddled with what David Brading has 
recently called 'a latent contradiction which he fails to resolve in any 
satisfactory manner' and which he explains as the result of 'his subordination 
of humanitarian and religious interests to political expediency'.102 In the 
context of the Nominalist streak in his thought, by contrast, Acosta's position 
is perfectly coherent. For despite the clear political slant that can be detected 
in Acosta's triumphalist celebrations of the Conquest as the fulfilment of a 
Providential design, in the light of the contemporary philosophical need to draw 
a sharp line between the natural and the supernatural, his work can be seen as 
the most able and persuasive exposition of an attitude to the Indian past that 
would become dominant until the first half of the eighteenth century. Nor is it 
surprising that, in due course, the decline of the obsession with demonism and 
of the tendency to 'demonise' the Indian past should have coincided, not with 
any visible political shift, but with the increasing realisation among Christian 
thinkers, from the last years of the seventeenth century onwards, that the only 
means to preserve a viable Theodicy which would leave any room for a 
credible demonology was a return to the medieval doctrine of the concordance 
between nature and grace.103 
Consequently, the reasons why the Indian past was 'demonised' in the minds 
of the majority of churchmen and intellectuals after Trent go much further than 
the exclusively political motives that are commonly advanced to explain the 
development. To view the process of Indian 'demonisation' as the expression 
of an imperialist - as opposed to a missionary - approach to conversion, might 
make some sense in the case of Acosta's triumphalist style, of his flirtations 
with Viceroy Toledo and of his apparently deliberate ignorance of the writings 
of Las Casas. But why, then, should Franciscan writers like Fray Geronimo de 
Mendieta and Fray Juan de Torquemada, who knew and used the writings of 
the Dominican, have nevertheless opted to follow the interpretation of the facts 
suggested by Acosta? Clearly an imperialist, political interpretation of the 
development is unsatisfactory when such a question is posed. Torquemada's 
Monarquia Indiana, in particular, parallels the ambivalence we detected in 
Acosta to an extent that would be difficult to overestimate. While, on the one 
hand, he presents us with a resolute defence of Indian cultures, overwhelming 
us with comparisons drawn from classical antiquity, comparing Moctezuma 
with Alexander, and seeking to demonstrate the progression of Indian history 
from a state of savagery to one of civilisation, on the other he confidently 
asserts that Indian religions belong, in the last resort, to the Kingdom of 
Darkness, its seemingly noble expressions being, in fact, the product of direct 
demonic intervention.104 
This sombre pessimism about Indian religiosity, which permeates the thought 
of most writers after Las Casas and which became dominant throughout the 
Colonial period, is more likely to respond to an intellectual concern than to any 
conscious political design. In claiming this, it has been far from my intention 
to lay the whole weight of the argument on the shoulders of Acosta. My choice 
of his work to illustrate a tendency which was much more widespread derived 
from the incomparable clarity with which it highlights the central issue of the 
Nominalist streak in post Trent theology and the implications that this had on 
any assessment of the Indian past. It is fair to stress, moreover, that Acosta 
himself would undoubtedly have been horrified at the developments that 
subsequently derived from this tendency. He would have been as impatient with 
the so-called 'extirpators' of idolatry in the seventeenth century as he had been 
with those 'ignorant friars' who saw the devil at work in any Indian practice 
that did not corform with European custom.105 Paradoxically, however, 
Acosta's ambivalent insistence on the natural goodness and on the supernatural 
evil of Indian civilisation served only to confirm the established fears, and 
subsequent observers too often proved ill-equipped to distinguish clearly 
between the two spheres. By the end of the sixteenth century any genuine 
interest in the logic of Indian cultures seemed to have disappeared. Cultural 
expressions that Acosta would have seen as harmless were increasingly classed 
as part of a more widespread Indian initiative where 'under the guise and 
appearance of religion, they dealt with their own rites, giving cult to the Devil 
and plotting against our Christian religion',106 a preoccupation that would 
become the rule throughout the seventeenth century and which would lead to 
the wholesale 'demonisation' of Indian cultures not just in the minds of the 
educated but, as it emerges from the archives of the Inquisition during this 
period, of the population at large.107 
In all this, of course, power and politics played a central role. Nevertheless, 
it has been my contention that a more thorough consideration of the implica-
tions of the intellectual assumptions behind demonism can provide a necessary 
corrective to the more common explanation along exclusively political lines, 
with its implicit condemnation of the European failure to understand 'the 
other'. For, especially at a time when the social historians have discovered the 
significance of the anthropological concept of 'the other', it is the task of the 
intellectual historians to remind them that our early modern Europeans are just 
as 'other' to us as the American Indians were to them. To fail to do so would 
mean at least as great an injustice towards early modern Europeans as that 
which is often imputed to them for failing to understand the Indians. 
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